ASRS CALLBACK includes excerpts from ASRS incident reports with supporting commentary. In addition, CALLBACK may contain summaries of ASRS research studies and related aviation safety information. CALLBACK is one of the ASRS's most effective tools for improving the quality of human performance in the National Aviation System (NAS) at the grass roots level.

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

CALLBACK 436 - May 2016


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 436
May 2016
Never Again!
While mistakes are a part of the learning process, after a certain level of proficiency is acquired, the constructive value of mistakes diminishes. In fact, much time and effort has been devoted to the study of human factors, training, system design, procedures, etc. in order to minimize the occurrence of errors among more experienced individuals.

This issue of CALLBACK looks at some errors encountered by people in various aviation professions who were at a level of proficiency where they “never again” wanted to repeat a particular error. But, to err is human. To continue learning from our own mistakes is a good thing and learning from the mistakes of others is even better. As Eleanor Roosevelt is reported to have said, “Learn from the mistakes of others. You can’t live long enough to make them all yourself.”
A Missed Opportunity
When the classic human factors elements of fatigue, get-home-itis, and expectation bias teamed up with improper approach procedures, this PA-28 Pilot narrowly escaped becoming a statistic rather than a wiser pilot with a valuable lesson to share.
I have many hours and many approaches to minimums as a single-pilot operator, mostly in Part 91 flying. I have flown very few missed approaches in that time. Based upon the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) and current weather at the time of the approach, I expected to break out well above minimums. The aircraft did not have an autopilot and my hand-flown ILS approach was rock solid…. I looked up fully expecting to see the runway in sight for continuation and landing on Runway 31.

I saw nothing of the runway environment…. I had made no mental accommodation to do a missed approach as I just knew that my skills would allow me to land as they had so many times in past years. The only conscious control input that I can recall is leveling at the MDA [Rather than continuing to the DA? –Ed.] while continuing to focus outside the cockpit for the runway environment. It just had to be there! I do not consciously remember looking at the flight instruments as I began…an uncontrolled, unconscious 90-degree turn to the left, still looking for the runway environment.

Through a break in the clouds and fog (I don’t know how low I was), I saw a clear picture of the runway lights showing [a runway] intersection…. I just happened to be on a very low right base to the intersecting runway and reacted by chopping power, setting full flaps, and executing a steep right-hand turn at low altitude to land. I consider it a blessing to be able to write this report.

I was tired when I departed for my return flight, having avoided convective activity with Center help on the way in earlier that day. I did file an alternate based on the TAF, but really just wanted to get home and really never seriously considered that I would have to make a missed approach. I was flabbergasted when I looked up and could not see the runway and my behavior was all downhill from there. My perceptions, judgments, and decisions from that point were automatic, faulty, and flawed. The discipline to call a missed approached had totally evaded me as I wandered in the fog trying to see the runway.

Never again will I launch on an approach to low minimums without fully considering the real necessity of having to call a go-around and being much more aware of the implications of making that decision. The TAF was for better conditions than I encountered. At the time of approach, the ASOS (Automated Surface Observing Systems) was also reporting visibility and ceilings better than I experienced.

Even though I have always enjoyed making approaches to low minimums, I will bring a different mindset to the procedure in the future. I’m still refining my personal minimum rule; something along the line of doubling the [published minimum]. If the TAF is lower than that number then there must be a total expectation and commitment to either not take the flight or be totally committed to a missed approach and alternate airport landing when necessary. I was not, but lived to relate this story to you. I would also treat the TAF visibility in a similar fashion.
Early Descent
A familiar series of events led this pilot toward potential Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) before situational awareness was regained. The pilot offers some good insight into the value of single-pilot Crew Resource Management (CRM).
While diverting to an alternate, I received the ATIS and was being vectored for the ILS. After receiving a clearance for the approach, the Controller explained that he had just come on duty and was not aware that the glideslope was out of service. He apologized and amended my clearance to the LOC approach. I don’t remember the specific ceiling being reported, but I asked if anyone had made it in on the Localizer since I was thinking that the weather was too low. He checked with the Tower and replied, “Yes.” I accepted the clearance for the LOC, but with all the radio transmissions and cockpit distractions, I never gave myself time to “brief the approach.”

As soon as I was established, I started down to my first step down fix. Problem was, I was still outside the Final Approach Fix. I never received a TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) Alert, but realized my mistake when I received a “Terrain Alert” from my Number 2 NavCom. I arrested my descent and in doing so, the Alert went away. I had a “holy [cow]” moment, realizing what I had done and my potentially fatal CFIT situation. At that point I continued on the approach and, being in shock over the mistake I had just made, missed my next and final step down fix to the MDA. As I continued to the Missed Approach Point there was a small break in the overcast, but being high and in no place to make a stabilized approach to landing, I executed and reported “missed approach” to the Tower. They handed me back to TRACON and I was vectored to the ILS for another runway which concluded in a normal approach and landing.

While I found no unusual hazards in my “Preflight Risk Assessment,” it is apparent that my lack of familiarity with my destination airport combined with the lack of time for an approach briefing led to a lack of situational awareness in the approach procedure. In hindsight, better CRM may have included asking for vectors to come around again to intercept the final approach course, which would have allowed time for an appropriate approach briefing. Never again!
Under Pressure
When operational pressure and complacency influenced a routine tire change, this CRJ Maintenance Technician cut corners that could have cut short a career.
While I worked on a CRJ200 aircraft, two events stemmed from a #1 Main Landing Gear (MLG) tire change that I performed. I received a call from Maintenance Control to inspect damage of a #1 MLG tire. After receiving the limits via fax, I inspected the tire and found it to be beyond limits. Maintenance Control advised a new wheel assembly was going to be sent from another station along with the paperwork. When the wheel arrived, I skimmed through the paperwork and proceeded with the tire change. This is when multiple factors played into the mistakes I made. First: I did not deflate the old tire fully and it was later shipped out by a co-worker. Second: I failed to install a spacer on the new wheel which was not removed from the unserviceable assembly.

I clearly rushed through the Maintenance Manual due to complacency and to get the plane out on time after Maintenance Control stated that the pilots had an hour before they timed out. At the time I thought a tire is a tire, they’re all the same. I looked for the key points like torques and safety wiring which ultimately led to my mistakes. It was dark, which added to my missing the spacer and I did not have the proper tool on hand to deflate the tire, which led me to only partially deflating it. I know what I did was wrong and I definitely learned from it. I will never again jeopardize my licenses and career like this.
From Complacency to Crisis
A low stress environment can lead to complacency and increase one’s susceptibility to committing errors. For this Air Traffic Controller, a routine departure vector culminated in a traffic alert in which technology likely prevented a midair.
An M20 was enroute at 9,000 feet, west to east. A CRJ200 was a departure off Runway 11. Traffic was slow and I was only controlling four planes. I established radar contact with the CRJ200 on departure and put him on course. The CRJ200 was climbing out of about 4,000 feet when I switched him to Center. At the time, the conflict with the 9,000 foot overflight M20 was about 15 to 20 miles away and I did not see it. I saw the conflict when the aircraft were about six to seven miles apart and opposite direction to each other. I called to the aircraft I was talking to (the M20) and told him to turn right heading 180 immediately and then gave him the traffic call. I did not wait for the response and called Center and said to turn the CRJ200 north. Both aircraft were on east/west lines opposite direction to each other. The CRJ200 was heading 270; the M20 heading 090. I again called the M20 to turn right heading 180 immediately with no response. I made the call again, no response. Then the M20 called and said, “Are you calling me?” and I realized I had been using the wrong callsign. The callsign had a “W” and I had been calling “M.” The aircraft passed clear thanks to TCAS and a RA alert.

This near midair was completely my fault. I was complacent and focused on the departure aircraft. I gave him the same thing we always give them. The slowness of the position and routine of the departure lulled me into a false sense of awareness. I have [many] years of ATC experience and this goes to show you can never let your guard down. If TCAS had not been on the aircraft, the outcome could have been catastrophic. I have learned from this error and will be forever diligent. Never again!
ASRS Database Online
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CALLBACK Issue 436
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Special Studies
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
February / March 2016
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 10,082
General Aviation Pilots 2,132
Controllers 1,170
Flight Attendants 1,161
Military/Other 670
Dispatchers 410
Mechanics 376
TOTAL 16,001
Jan. / Feb. / Mar. 2016
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject of Alert No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2
Hazard to Flight 2
Company Policy 1
TOTAL 5
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Contact the Editor
NOTE TO READERS:     Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 436



NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

CALLBACK 435 - April 2016


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 435
April 2016
The ASRS Celebrates 40th Anniversary (1976 - 2016)
Safety Depends on Lessons Learned
On April 16, 2016, the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) celebrated its 40th year of continuous operation in service to aviation safety.

The longevity and success of the ASRS program are remarkable examples of how aviation system users can contribute their “lessons learned” to a safety program that collects and analyzes this information to resolve issues associated with our modern aviation system.
The Origin of ASRS
On December 1, 1974, TWA Flight 514 was inbound through cloudy and turbulent skies to Dulles Airport in Virginia. The flight crew misunderstood an ATC clearance and descended to 1,800 feet before reaching the approach segment to which that minimum altitude applied. The aircraft collided with a mountaintop, killing all aboard.

A disturbing finding emerged from the ensuing NTSB accident investigation. Six weeks prior to the TWA accident, a United Airlines flight crew had experienced an identical clearance misunderstanding and narrowly missed hitting the same Virginia mountaintop. The United crew discovered their close call after landing and reported the incident to their company. A cautionary notice was issued to all United pilots.

Tragically, there existed no method of sharing the United pilots’ knowledge with TWA and other airlines. Following the TWA accident, it was determined that safety information must be shared with the entire aviation community. Thus was born the idea of a national aviation incident reporting program that would be non-punitive, voluntary, and confidential.
On a snowy morning in ‘Seventy Four
A plane crashed near D.C.
The weather was bad, but there was more,
According to the NTSB.

Human factors played a role in the tragedy,
That could‘ve been prevented,
So the FAA worked hard on a remedy,
And the ASRS was “invented.”
The FAA and NASA Collaborate
The first step in establishing a national aviation incident reporting program was to design a system in which the aviation community could place a high degree of trust.

The FAA Administrator recognized that the regulatory and enforcement roles of the FAA would discourage the aviation community from using a new safety program that depended on voluntary sharing of safety events. The FAA therefore assumed a sponsorship role for the new program, but turned to a neutral and highly respected third party – NASA – to collect, process, and analyze the voluntarily submitted reports.

Under a Memorandum of Agreement between the two agencies in August 1975, the blueprint for operating the newly designated Aviation Safety Reporting System was set in place: the FAA would fund the program and provide for its immunity provisions, while NASA would set program policy and administer operations. The ASRS program began day-to-day operation in April 1976.
Safety reporting wasn’t something new;
It just needed amplification,
With a more inclusive, systemic view,
And NASA’s collaboration.

It would have to be confidential and voluntary,
The researchers concluded,
And lest flight crews, techs and others be wary,
Limited immunity was included.
The ASRS Concept is Proven
The ASRS program has continually demonstrated the value of “safety lessons learned.” If a system’s users are encouraged to report the safety problems they encounter to a program they can trust, safety goals will be reached much sooner than if we never hear the stories of those lessons learned.
With a growing cache of valuable lessons learned,
Program success was assured,
And since reports covered many safety concerns,
It was time to get out the word.
ASRS Safety Products Benefit
the Aviation Community
The ASRS concept embodies a circle of information feedback that begins with pilots, controllers, maintenance technicians, flight attendants, dispatchers and others who voluntarily report their safety experiences to the program. During its 40-year history, the ASRS has processed over 1.3 million reports and returned valuable information to the aviation community through a wealth of safety products.
  • More than 6,200 Safety Alert Messages have been provided to government and aviation industry decision makers.
Alert Messages highlight critical matters,
And include information,
On parts, procedures and emerging patterns,
That need amelioration.

Examples include RNAV STAR confusion,
And similar fix names,
The growing issue of UAV intrusions,
And flammable battery claims.

Also glare from a solar power array,
And automation dependency,
Problems with fusion radar display,
And approach chart complexity.

Teleconferences address Alert observations,
In substantial detail,
Exploring everything from dangerous operations,
To aircraft parts that fail.
  • There have been 7,100 database Search Requests to support aviation community efforts, research studies, publications, safety promotion activities, accident investigations, and more.
Search Requests are custom compilations,
Of ASRS reports,
For targeted research, investigations,
And training support.
  • 435 issues of ASRS’s award-winning monthly safety bulletin, CALLBACK, have been produced. CALLBACK is now electronically delivered to more than 30,000 individuals and viewed by more than 35,000 readers on the ASRS website every month.
Back in ‘Seventy Eight
CALLBACK was proposed,
In a monthly format,
To share valuable lessons learned by some of those,
Who’ve “been there; done that.”

CALLBACK’s status became monumental,
According to the editor,
By staying relevant and non-judgmental,
With no real competitor.
  • More than 60 topical Research Studies have been published, including completion of more than 124 Quick Response efforts examining all aspects of human and system performance.
Special Studies take a closer look at an issue,
Such as wake turbulence,
To identify the factors involved and to review,
The related incidents.
  • The Database Online (DBOL) was developed in response to popular demand for access to the ASRS Database to retrieve incident reports for use in research, safety promotion, and task force efforts.
Use of the Database Online or DBOL,
Available since Two Thousand Six,
Confirms that it’s working very well,
For researchers and academics.
  • Public access to program information, publications, immunity policies, database report sets, reporting forms, and more can be found on the ASRS web site at: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov.
ASRS Future Developments
As the ASRS moves into its fifth decade of service, it will continue to prevail as the premier industry-wide safety reporting program. ASRS has collected, analyzed, and responded to voluntarily submitted reports from all corners of the National Aviation System. The program has undoubtedly strengthened the foundation of human factors safety research, as well as identified deficiencies and discrepancies in training, equipment, and procedures that may otherwise have led to aviation accidents.

Ever increasing report volumes from individuals who work in ever changing operating environments will require more of the ASRS in the future. To remain relevant to these demands, ASRS seeks ways to integrate its information in a complementary manner with Safety Management Systems (SMS) and other aviation data sources, and also to produce an increasing number of safety information products.
The key to what ASRS does,
And will always do,
Is that it only works because,
Of reports from you.
ASRS Database Online
The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more.
 Search ASRS Database »
CALLBACK Issue 435
 Download PDF & Print
 View HTML
ASRS Online Resources
 CALLBACK Previous Issues
 Report to ASRS
 View ASRS Report Sets
 ASRS Homepage
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Contact the Editor
Special Studies
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Contact the Editor
A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 435



NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

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