ASRS CALLBACK includes excerpts from ASRS incident reports with supporting commentary. In addition, CALLBACK may contain summaries of ASRS research studies and related aviation safety information. CALLBACK is one of the ASRS's most effective tools for improving the quality of human performance in the National Aviation System (NAS) at the grass roots level.

Monday, March 18, 2013

CALLBACK 398 - March 2013


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 398
March 2013
Rotorcraft Roundup
We’ve corralled a few helicopter reports since the last “Roundup” and present them here for the benefit of all hands. While helicopters and fixed wing aircraft may differ in form and function, most of the basic principles of safe operation apply to both. So, no matter what sort of rig you’re riding, everyone in the outfit should be able to wrangle a lesson or two from this roundup of ASRS helicopter reports.
PUT YOUR BOOTS ON BEFORE YOU SADDLE UP
Distractions, including a lack of boots, caused this MD-500 Pilot to forget a critical item in gettin’ the rig ready.
At the beginning of the shift, I performed the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and noted that the fuel level was down below 300 pounds and was going to need to be topped off. Normally when an aircraft is left down for fuel, the crew leaving it down is supposed to leave a placard on the instrument panel alerting other crews of the fuel situation. In this case there was no placard left on the panel. Due to the hot weather, I performed the pre-flight inspection in my civilian clothes (shorts and T-shirt). Once I pushed the aircraft out of the hangar, I decided it would be better to fuel the aircraft once I had my flight suit and boots on, in case fuel was spilled while fueling. I left the aircraft without a placard on the panel and went inside to change my clothes.

Once I changed into my flight suit, I was distracted by administrative details inside the office and forgot to go back out and fuel the aircraft. Approximately one hour later, we took off on a mission and I failed to note the reduced fuel state. I believed that I had a full tank of fuel and I was only planning on flying for one hour. A full tank of fuel will normally allow two hours of flight time with a reserve. About an hour into the flight I noticed a yellow caution light briefly flicker. I pressed the “Test” button and realized the light was the “Low Fuel” caution light. It was indicating below 100 pounds of fuel. Realizing that I had forgotten to fuel the aircraft prior to departure, I turned toward the airport and reduced power, but then I decided to make a precautionary landing in a suitable area rather than risk having a flameout trying to make it back.

Upon noting the low fuel state during pre-flight, I should have immediately put fuel in the aircraft so that it was mission ready. To alleviate this situation in the future, I should always pre-flight the aircraft in the proper clothing so if the aircraft needs to be serviced I will be able to take care of the situation immediately. Another option is I could have left a placard on the panel upon noticing the low fuel state which would have reminded me prior to takeoff that the fuel level was low.
CLOUDS ALONG THE TRAIL
Stumblin’ into IMC is often cited as a factor in weather related incidents and accidents. Getting a thorough pre-flight weather briefing along with making contingency plans can go a long way toward easin’ the effects of weather. This helicopter wrangler learned just how quickly a change in the weather can result in a change of plans.
The weather [was] clear; visibility 10 miles…. Enroute I noted a broken ceiling at 900-1,000 feet. [At] 1,500 feet I noted extensive cloud/fog cover below on the route of flight [and] I was unable to maintain visual contact with the ground. [I] elected to return to the point of departure.

Deteriorating conditions were encountered about 40 minutes from the departure airport. I checked weather at [a nearby airport] which showed broken at 1,200 feet. Upon arrival, however, conditions were solid overcast and deteriorating. After conversing with the Tower, I elected to declare an emergency due to my fuel state and the need to descend through the clouds. The helicopter is not IFR equipped and I am not instrument rated. I descended through the clouds, breaking out at about 1,000 feet AGL and landed without further incident.
A TRACON Controller gave the ATC perspective on the same incident.
The airport was reporting a marginal VFR ceiling of 1,000 feet overcast. A helicopter called about 25 miles West of the airport inbound with the ATIS. I vectored him for sequence and…then told him to resume his own navigation to the airport. I called him three times, giving him the location of the airport. He did not answer until the third call and he said that he couldn’t see the airport because there were some clouds between him and the airport. I told him to maintain VFR and contact the Tower. A couple of minutes later, the Tower called me and advised that the aircraft was an emergency with low fuel and unable to get down. I checked with three other aircraft in my airspace looking for a hole in the clouds, but none were found. The crash crew responded and other traffic was broken off of the approach behind him as he maneuvered down through the clouds.

I had worked the helicopter for about 25 miles. He said that he had the ATIS with the reported overcast layer. He accepted traffic calls and said he was looking for traffic. At no point did he indicate any fuel criticality nor did he mention that he might have any issue descending. Only once did he mention clouds between him and the airport. I assumed this was a small scud deck that he expected not to be an issue. The pilot should have mentioned his concern with the weather much earlier. It goes without saying that the pilot should have checked the weather before getting airborne and taken on sufficient fuel.
A WILD RIDE
Two fella’s hitched up an R22, wandered into some weather, went for a wild ride and wound up headin’ straight for the ground. Luckily they were able to rein in their helo and set ’er down in a pasture.
My student and I departed...on a cross country flight under VFR conditions...after the fog had cleared. The clouds were high and we could see for miles on end. We flew GPS direct...and [then] the clouds got lower, going from 1,000 feet to 600 feet AGL. There was also some fog near the ground that was thinning. We decided to proceed North...around protected airspace...and then head West towards [an] airport which was reporting better weather. We were able to maintain VFR cloud separation at 300 feet AGL until we reached the northern tip of the protected airspace where we hit some low, dense fog.

Knowing that there was better weather nearby, my student and I continued onward, flying a gradual descent to stay clear of the clouds. We reached a point at about 200 feet AGL where we could no longer fly any lower due to the terrain and tall trees and decided to turn around and abandon our cross country. As we began the turn, we entered the clouds and inadvertently went into IMC. Since we couldn’t see any obstructions around us we decided to also climb back up to 400 feet AGL to avoid hitting anything in the turn. We then became disoriented and soon afterwards we came out of the clouds with the nose pointed straight down. I recovered from the pushover and landed in a field nearby to assess any damage to the helicopter. Upon finding no appreciable damage, we flew the helicopter directly back to [our home field].

In hindsight we should have abandoned the cross country sooner instead of pushing on into the clouds. Had we decided to land at the intermediate airport or turn around to go back home, we wouldn’t have entered the clouds and become disoriented.
HOLD ON TO YOUR HAT, PARDNER!
An EMS helicopter wrangler who felt a mysterious shudderin’ in his seat bones, offers a mighty good lesson that applies to all pilots wrestlin’ with an in-flight problem — stay focused and fly the aircraft.
The medical crew had requested a rooftop shutdown for patient offload and the shutdown was uneventful. I secured and physically checked all doors starting on the left side around to the pilot door on the right side and visually inspected all panel latches during the walk-around inspection. I entered the cabin on the right side (behind the pilot seat) to shutoff cabin lights left on by the medical crew and observed both flight helmets, one located on a forward-facing right seat and the other on the aft-facing left seat. The pilot door remained open during normal startup and was closed after the checklist was completed for repositioning. I observed the DOOR annunciator light go out and executed a normal takeoff. Shortly after transition to forward flight, I noted minor abnormal vibrations with excessive rotor noise. I had already initiated a right turn…and noted the vibrations worsened with increased airspeed. I observed no warnings or indications of a problem. I surmised that the vibrations could possibly be a result of a cabin window left open by the aircrew. I opened the pilot door window in an attempt to equalize pressure. The problem persisted and worsened with continued acceleration. I reduced power and airspeed…and made a normal landing.

The left cabin door had opened and slid full aft and the flight helmet on the left seat was missing…. The helmet was found close to the departure point where I had initiated the right turn.

If something doesn’t feel right, despite the absence of any system or annunciator indication, consider what you feel and what your gut instinct tells you. Be prepared for anything and above all stay focused while you FLY THE AIRCRAFT.
CALLBACK Issue 398
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January 2013
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 3,932
General Aviation Pilots 914
Controllers 762
Cabin 285
Mechanics 124
Dispatcher 79
Military/Other 25
TOTAL 6,121
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2
Airport Facility or Procedure 4
ATC Equipment or Procedure 3
Maintenance Procedure 1
TOTAL 10
Special Studies
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
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NOTE TO READERS:     Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 398
Forward to a Friend!


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

CALLBACK 397 - February 2013


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 397
February 2013
You and UAS
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) — also referred to as “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (UAV’s), “Remotely Piloted Vehicles” (RPV’s), “unmanned aircraft” or “drones” — come in a wide range of configurations and sizes, and have multiple military and civilian functions.

UAS operations utilize a Pilot-in-Command who is controlling the aircraft from a remote location. In the event of a data link failure or other malfunction the system may revert to a pre-programmed mode.

The FAA is under congressional mandate to integrate most UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) by 2015 (2014 for UAS weighing less than 55 pounds) with the primary focus and authority being safety. In planning the integration of UAS into the NAS, the FAA has to develop a safe and efficient way that these systems can operate in the same airspace as crewed aircraft without creating a hazard to other aircraft or to people and property on the ground.

To date, UAS access to the NAS remains restricted pending development of appropriate operational procedures, standards, and policies. The FAA approves UAS operations on a case-by-case basis. UAS authorized by the FAA to operate in controlled airspace have to comply with appropriate FAR or equivalent military standards related to aircraft and operator certification as well as equipment and communication requirements.

The following ASRS reports are presented to increase Pilot and Controller awareness of UAS operations and to provide some insight into the systems from an Operator’s viewpoint. Additionally, UAS Operators may gain a better appreciation of the interaction of UAS with other elements in the NAS.
UAS Altitude Excursions
Four ASRS reports describe incidents in which UAS departed from their assigned altitude. In the first report, an Air Traffic Controller observed a UAS altitude deviation and also expressed concern for the consequences of UAS data link failures.
While working an adjacent sector, I witnessed a UAS deviate from his assigned altitude. This UAS was cleared to maintain FL350. The [UAS] aircraft descended out of FL350 to FL300 without a clearance. When questioned by the Air Traffic Controller, the Remote Pilot stated that he could not maintain FL350 so he descended.

I feel this event happened due to the training of the Remote Pilots of the unmanned aircraft. The accountability and standards for remotely piloted, unmanned aircraft should be equal to the standards of commercial pilots.

Also, unmanned aircraft must be held to the same restrictions as manned aircraft. For example, in a [UA] System, if the aircraft loses data link it will fly its programmed flight plan. It will not maintain its last assigned altitude. This can affect the Controller’s ability to maintain positive separation.
An Operator reported losing aerodynamic control of the UAS and was too busy reestablishing control to immediately notify ATC of the problem. It is not known if the UAS Copilot had communications capability with ATC.
I requested a climb from FL190 to FL250 to climb above weather. Before entering into a climb, I asked the Copilot to perform a full sweep with the camera to look for clouds and adverse weather. None was noted.

Climbing through FL210, conditions were encountered that affected the performance of the [UAS] aircraft and resulted in a loss of altitude from FL210 to 16,500 feet MSL. Due to my efforts to fully regain positive control of the aircraft, I failed to declare an emergency. As soon as I regained positive control, I initiated an immediate climb to the cleared altitude of FL250. ATC advised of the deviation in altitude. I advised ATC that the descent was due to weather and the aircraft was currently in a climb to FL250. The flight level request was amended to FL290 in order to fly above the weather.
A Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA authorizes a UAS operator to use a defined airspace and includes special provisions unique to each operation. Most, if not all, COAs require coordination with an appropriate Air Traffic Control facility and may require the UAS to have a transponder to operate in certain types of airspace. The UAS Operator who submitted this report to ASRS was operating in accordance with a COA when the data link to the UAS was lost.
My UAV was conducting assigned missions at FL200 in accordance with a COA issued by the FAA. At one point in the mission the UAV descended to FL190 without an ATC clearance. At the time of this violation, we lost a control link…with the [UAS] aircraft. As we were then unable to verify the aircraft’s position or obtain critical flight information, the command link with the [UAS] aircraft was disabled releasing it on its emergency mission profile in accordance with the approved emergency checklist. The [UAS] aircraft then began squawking 7600 and entered autonomous flight proceeding direct to the assigned emergency mission loiter point and descended to a pre-programmed altitude of FL190.

The remote command link with the UAV was lost for several minutes. This command link allows the aircraft to be flown by a PIC approximately 1,000 miles away using satellite relayed commands. It was this link that was lost and the aircraft was then released to its pre-programmed emergency rendezvous point where it would then be picked up visually and landed by on-site operators. In this case the command link was regained after several minutes and the aircraft flown directly by the PIC to a point where it could be visually acquired by the on-site crew and was landed safely. Maintenance investigation is required to ascertain the reason for the lost link before the aircraft is again released for flight operations.
In another report from a UAS Operator, the aircraft experienced an altitude and heading deviation due to loss of the data link, but the Operator made a timely report to ATC.
Due to an inadvertent SPMA (Signal Processor Modem Assembly) reset during a backup communications power up, the UAS experienced a Lost Link situation. The UAS was cruising at FL230 to avoid weather when the Lost Link occurred. The Operator failed to update the Lost Link Profile to reflect the ATC clearance which caused the aircraft to turn towards the closest Lost Link entry point and initiate a descent to FL190 which was the previous Lost Link Profile. The Operator immediately called ATC and notified Center that the link should be regained within two minutes. Once the SPMA link was reestablished, the aircraft climbed to its previous altitude of FL230.

No additional information was requested by Center after communications were regained and the flight continued without further incident. A software change request is being researched for added protection from inadvertent SPMA resets.
Close Encounter
A small UAS encountered by the Pilot of a manned aircraft may have been outside its designated airspace. If ATC is not aware of a UAS, Pilots have to rely on see and avoid procedures and handle UAS conflicts the same as conflicts with manned aircraft.
My passengers and I noticed an oblong shaped UAV (approximately two to three feet long with a long antenna) passing us in the opposite direction within 100 feet of our left wing on the 45-degree entry to Runway 15…. The object did not show up on my TCAS system as a threat. These vehicles need to show up in the cockpit as a threat or stay within the Military Operating Area (MOA).
Additional UAS information can be found at the following FAA websites:

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association has a free interactive course, Unmanned Aircraft and the National Airspace System at:
CALLBACK Issue 397
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December 2012
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,037
General Aviation Pilots 936
Controllers 710
Cabin 240
Mechanics 154
Dispatcher 104
Military/Other 26
TOTAL 6,207
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 6
Airport Facility or Procedure 6
ATC Equipment or Procedure 9
Maintenance Procedure 2
Company Policy 1
TOTAL 24
Special Studies
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
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Contact the Editor
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Facebook - Like
NOTE TO READERS:     Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 397
Forward to a Friend!


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

CALLBACK 396 - January 2013


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 396
January 2013
What Would You Have Done?
This “interactive” issue of CALLBACK, presents three in-flight situations that involve General Aviation Pilots and one takeoff scenario that involves an Air Carrier Flight Crew. In “The First Half of the Story” you will find report excerpts describing the situation up to the decision point. It is up to the reader to determine the possible courses of action and make a decision (preferably within the same time frame that was available to the reporter).

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to exercise your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story” you will find the actions actually taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought, discussion, and training related to the type of incidents that were reported.
The First Half of the Story
Situation # 1: (C172RG Pilot's Report)
On departure, the gear retracted normally. However, immediately after retraction I heard a loud “POP” followed by a call from Tower indicating that my left main gear had retracted then fallen down again. Another aircraft behind me confirmed seeing the same thing.

The aircraft has a gear mirror installed on the right wing which allowed me to view all three gear. The left main was in a trailing position. The nose and right main were retracted. I cycled the gear. The left main didn’t move from its in-trail position.

I advised Tower that I would troubleshoot the gear and tried yawing the aircraft and maneuvering so as to swing the gear with inertia into the locked position…. Unable to retract or extend the gear, I made a call…to an A&P to confirm my suspicion that it was most likely the gear actuator that had broken loose from the pivot point…. I could land with the right main and nose gear down and locked or fully retracted. I could also land under power or secure the engine and try to save the engine and prop.

I had planned to leave at 0730, but the weather was 500 foot ceiling and 2 miles visibility. The lowest approach minimum at [my destination] was 1 mile visibility and 800 foot ceiling. The runway was short (2,000 feet) and there were no approach lights. I waited over two hours for the weather to improve, but it didn’t. I decided to request a Special VFR clearance after phoning the destination FBO. They told me the visibility there was at least 3-4 miles and the ceiling was definitely 500 feet or better. I assumed the ceiling would be at least 500 feet all the way on the 4-5 minute flight. When I got a few miles east of the airport the ceiling suddenly dropped and I had to decide whether to stay at 500 feet AGL and pop into the clouds or descend to remain clear.

When I had flown the route IFR earlier in the day the ceilings were about 3,500 to 4,000 feet. I decided to make the return trip VFR with flight following and stay under the 3,000 foot floor of the…Bravo airspace since that is what ATC would have had me do had I filed IFR. All was well until I reached the shoreline. I was at 2,700 feet and I was cleared by Approach through the Class D at or above 2,500 feet, but I had to stay below the Bravo airspace at 3,000 feet. As I reached land, the ceiling dropped to just about 2,700 feet so I descended to 2,500 feet, but that still put me in the base of the clouds. Then ATC warned me about traffic ahead on a missed approach and suddenly I found myself trapped in and out of the clouds, unable to descend without busting the Delta airspace. Meanwhile I could not see the traffic which was being called out straight ahead by the traffic warning system.

On takeoff roll approaching 80 knots, the Tower Controller called us and said in a very slow, unsure voice, “[Callsign 1…2…3…4…](pause).” He sounded as if he had something to tell us, but did not know what to say. We both noted a tone of concern and hesitation in his voice as if he was still unsure of something at that moment. We were light weight and had 13,000 feet of runway ahead of us. We had to make an immediate decision.
The Rest of the Story

The Reporter's Action:
At the cost of an engine and prop, but with significant risk reduction, I elected to land under power with right main and nose retracted. I contacted Tower, advised of our situation…and our intention to land gear up…. We landed uneventfully on the centerline with a soft, controlled, low energy touchdown; no fuel leaks, no hydraulic leaks, no oil leaks, no fire, and no injuries. The damage to the airframe was pretty minimal, however the propeller was obviously destroyed and therefore the engine will require teardown.

I felt it appropriate to make a report to document the decision-making on landing under power which I would highly recommend rather than making the error of “trying to save the engine and prop” and reducing options on landing. Because the sink was greater than I anticipated, I did need to add additional power just prior to touchdown. Should I have tried to “save” the engine, it would have made for a solid impact with the runway increasing damage to the airframe and possibly resulting in injury. Leaving the engine running, I was able to make a gentle, low energy touchdown. The resulting sensation in the cockpit was like a normal landing (louder, but normal forces), zero injuries, and a happy outcome. Again, I would highly recommend a low total energy touchdown under power for anyone finding they need to make a forced gear-up landing. The aircraft, engine, propeller can all be replaced and it’s not worth “trying to save” a machine at the cost of possible injury.

Thank you for providing the Aviation Safety Reporting System. As a long-time pilot, I find this open sharing of information valuable to aviation safety.

The Reporter's Action:
I decided to descend and went down to what I estimated to be about 350 feet AGL. Even though it was a sparsely populated area, I flew over two housing developments below 500 feet AGL. At three miles out, I saw the airport and runway, and the ceiling increased. I made an uneventful landing and it wasn’t till after I got out of the plane that I realized that I had busted the regulation for minimum altitude over a structure or vehicle. The basic cause was that I had made a false assumption that the ceiling would be at least 500 feet all the way since the two airports were only 10-11 miles apart. This was definitely a case of poor judgment on my part. In the future, I will not assume that the ceiling will remain uniform and give myself more margin for error. I should have waited until the ceiling was at least 800 to 1,000 feet. My desire to get an annual underway ASAP at [my destination] also played a role similar to the old “get-home-itis.”

The Reporter's Action:
I was able to turn into clear weather over the airport, away from the traffic, but busted VFR minimums and descended into the top 100 feet of the Delta airspace. I should have monitored the ATIS while I was over the ocean and asked for a clearance when it was clear I could not maintain VFR minimums (although it turned out to be mostly clear directly over the airport) or circled when the weather closed in and asked for a clearance. Next time I will get the clearance first and cancel if the weather accommodates.

The Reporter's Action:
I elected to initiate rejected takeoff procedures. During deceleration the Tower Controller said, “Disregard.” The sound of one’s voice, the tone and force, all convey a message. I did not like the message I was receiving and could not gamble that he was trying, but unable, to warn us of something ahead. I would take the same action again.
(From the First Officer’s report on the same incident)
I believe the rejected takeoff was the right thing to do. When you get a call from Tower at that point in the takeoff roll, the first thing that pops into your mind is “something’s wrong.” In the few seconds before he finished his thought, we were left to guess what the call was about. We were still relatively slow speed on the roll, so the Captain did what was prudent and safe by rejecting.
CALLBACK Issue 396
 Download PDF & Print
 View HTML
ASRS Online Resources
 CALLBACK Previous Issues
 Report to ASRS
 Search ASRS Database
 ASRS Homepage
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Forward to a Friend
Contact the Editor
November 2012
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 3,498
General Aviation Pilots 1,064
Controllers 654
Cabin 275
Mechanics 130
Dispatcher 77
Military/Other 17
TOTAL 5,715
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1
Airport Facility or Procedure 7
ATC Equipment or Procedure 4
Maintenance Procedure 1
Company Policy 1
TOTAL 14
Special Studies
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more »
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Forward to a Friend
Contact the Editor
Facebook
Share with Twitter
LinkedIn
Facebook - Like
NOTE TO READERS or  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 396
Forward to a Friend!


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

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