ASRS CALLBACK includes excerpts from ASRS incident reports with supporting commentary. In addition, CALLBACK may contain summaries of ASRS research studies and related aviation safety information. CALLBACK is one of the ASRS's most effective tools for improving the quality of human performance in the National Aviation System (NAS) at the grass roots level.

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

CALLBACK 415 - August 2014


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 415
August 2014
The Go-Around Decision - What Would You Have Done?
Once again CALLBACK offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story” you will find report excerpts describing the event up to the decision point. You may then use your own judgment to determine the possible courses of action and make a decision regarding the best way to resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to exercise your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions actually taken in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported.

The following reports all involve a situation in which the pilots had a choice between landing or going around to run an Abnormal checklist. In these, as well as most other irregular situations, an assessment of the problem and associated factors can help integrate the use of checklists with other adaptive problem solving techniques. Immediately going into the “Light on—Start checklist” mode may cause a pilot or flight crew to overlook other important elements of the situation. As one of the human factors researchers at NASA Ames said, “Checklists should not be used as a replacement for common sense. The first item on every Abnormal or Emergency checklist should be ‘Brain...…Engage’.”
The First Half of the Story
Situation # 1  B757 Captain’s Report
It was a visual approach. We had an ATC speed request of 180 knots to the Final Approach Fix and then slowed and selected Flaps 30 under 168 knots. Flaps went to the 20 position and then we got the TE and LE Disagree caution lights. We were on glideslope, on the VASIs, and in a position to land with the appropriate airspeed.

On an ILS approach we received a TE FLAP Disagree light and EICAS while configuring for final landing with the runway in sight.

Runway was in sight on final at approximately 1,400 feet AGL. Flying Pilot called for Flaps 30, Landing checklist. I selected Flaps 30 and noticed an EICAS message “Trailing Edge Flaps.” The flaps remained at 25 with the flap handle selected to 30. I asked the Flying Pilot if he noticed any “roll” in one direction or the other? He said, “No.” I then selected the flap handle back to 25 and informed him of the Trailing Edge Flaps EICAS message. At this point we were at 1,000 feet AGL and stable on final.

The Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was Pilot Monitoring. While configuring for landing, the Captain noticed the forward amber LE FLAPS TRANSIT light illuminated and called it out. I looked up at the overhead LE Devices Indicator and saw that the number one Slat Full Extend light was not illuminated green. I notified the Captain of this. We were descending via the glideslope on the visual with gear down and Flaps 15, somewhere between 2,000 feet and 1,000 feet AGL.

I stated that we will need to go around and work out the problem. The Captain indicated that he had been in this situation before and we were fine to land.

On approach at approximately 2,500 feet, we selected Thermal Anti-Ice (TAI) for the engines as we began to enter icing conditions (a cloud deck from approximately 2,500 feet to 800 feet). This was the first time during the flight that we used the TAI. The Number Two engine TAI showed a disagreement indication, a bright light on the overhead panel and a yellow indication on the engine instruments. We cycled the TAI several times to no avail. Fuel available was approximately 6,900 lbs. There was at least a 200-300 mile flight to find non-icing conditions.
The Rest of the Story

The Reporter's Action:
I elected to land with Flaps 20. I had the First Officer confirm the airspeed for Flaps 20. We landed on centerline, on speed, and in the landing touchdown zone. Approach was stabilized.

The Reporter's Action:
We elected to discontinue our approach to run the TE FLAP Disagree checklist. ATC provided vectors while we configured the plane for a Flaps 20 approach as the checklist directed. We coordinated with ATC for the ILS to a runway with more favorable winds. This took much longer than anticipated with the final result being a VOR approach at the last minute. We set up for the new approach, but did not see the runway at minimums and had to again go missed approach. By this point our fuel state was becoming a greater concern than the non-standard configuration for landing so we requested immediate vectors back to the ILS Runway XX as the winds were once again favorable for that approach. We ended up breaking out early and were able to then fly a Flaps 20 landing in visual conditions.

The Reporter's Action:
I elected to land rather than go around in order to run the QRH checklist since the flaps were at 25 with no noticeable roll. Once on the ground we attempted to retract the flaps but they remained at 25. I’m not really sure if the flaps would have retracted if we had attempted a go-around.

The Reporter's Action:
The approach was continued to a landing.
From the Captain’s report on the same incident:
I elected to continue, carry a higher speed and land the aircraft. After landing, the First Officer was questioning my decision and looked in the QRH. According to the QRH we should have gone around and come back with Flaps 15 for landing. I made the call to land and not to go back into the overcast. A Mechanic met the aircraft and found the number one slat was extending; however, we were not getting the indication.
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June 2014
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,100
General Aviation Pilots 1,223
Controllers 787
Flight Attendants 507
Mechanics 215
Military/Other 140
Dispatchers 122
TOTAL 8,094
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject No. of Alerts
Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 9
Airport Facility or Procedure 1
ATC Equipment or Procedure 2
TOTAL 12
Special Studies
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
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NOTE TO READERS or  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 415



NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

CALLBACK 414 - July 2014


CALLBACK From the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 414
July 2014
35 Years of Wisdom... and Wit
Dear Readers:
July 2014 marks another proud milestone for the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the 35th anniversary of CALLBACK.
Captain Rex Hardy, a decorated Naval Aviator and corporate test pilot, created the monthly safety bulletin, CALLBACK in 1979. Rex’s vision of a short, readable, and informal format to present the ASRS “lessons learned” was an immediate success. With his insight, talent, and determination, CALLBACK evolved into a widely recognized, award-winning publication. When Rex Hardy retired after producing the first 100 issues, the very capable and talented Dr. Rowena Morrison was able to step in and carry on the intent and spirit of Rex’s creation for 230 more issues.
Perhaps this letter from a reader offers the best tribute to the efforts of all the people at ASRS who have contributed to 35 successful years of CALLBACK.
“I congratulate the ASRS staff for continually producing one of the finest aviation safety tools in the industry. The quality is in your editing— nice use of themes, narratives always to the point without scolding. The slick magazines have similar products…[and] serve a useful purpose, to be sure. But it is only “Callback” which makes my spine tingle and butterflies fly in my stomach when I think, “That could have been ME,” as I read the narratives each month.

Please know the widespread appreciation we in the piloting community feel for your fine work. “Callback” is a great return for what I am sure is a miserly amount of tax funding. Some other agencies could take a lesson from you folks.”
– J.U.
We appreciate the kind words, but we also recognize that it is the generous input from people who are willing to share their observations and lessons learned that constitutes the heart of CALLBACK. The entire aviation community is indebted to every person who takes the time to submit a report to ASRS.
– Don Purdy, Editor
Many ASRS reports include a statement about the lesson (or lessons) learned by the reporter. Rather than the usual report narratives, this anniversary issue of CALLBACK presents several important lessons culled from reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System.

Taking the time to share a lesson learned is a good thing and, as mentioned earlier, we appreciate all of the reports submitted to ASRS. By heeding the advice offered below, however, you may avoid an error or incident.

Words of Wisdom from 35 Years of CALLBACK
— Time Pressure —
  • My first mistake came from reacting much too quickly. Take your time. Run the checklist when appropriate. Verify important switches with the other pilot before you move them.
  • To the extent possible, always get prepared on the ground, not while in the air. Don’t let external pressures make you rush to do something without being thoroughly prepared.
  • I was making a rushed approach to land. I have learned that when I am rushed is when I really need to take the time for the checklist.
— Automation —
  • I have learned a valuable lesson about my responsibility to make timely inputs to the aircraft when I realize that the automation isn’t doing what I expect it to do.
  • Aircraft are machines subject to malfunction and we pilots who operate them are humans subject to human error. As a pilot who plans on remaining on the line, I have learned a valuable lesson— monitor the autoflight system like a hawk.
  • I must keep in mind that the buttons on the Flight Guidance Controller are myth and what displays on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) is truth. In other words, I can’t rely on the aircraft to do what I command by simply pressing a button. I must verify that the plane is doing what I command by seeing what is displayed on the PFD.
  • I was counting on the autoflight system to fly the departure as it was supposed to and I got a little lax. Lesson learned! Garbage in, garbage out. If the route isn’t in there or it drops out, you’re not going to fly what you’re thinking you’ll fly.
— Fuel —
  • We thought we had a pretty good handle on our fuel state. Another minute or two of fuel and we would have made it safely to the airfield.
  • From now on I’ll visually check the fuel myself and I’ll keep track of the fuel I’m using in flight.
  • Next time I’ll make sure I have enough fuel for the unexpected and I hope others might be able to do the same without learning the hard way.
— Weather —
  • I learned that it is better to divert early than to press on in deteriorating conditions hoping for a positive outcome. No one should attempt to “scud run” in marginal VFR conditions as I did— with a near disastrous result. Never again.
  • Even though I have been flying for a number of years, I learned a valuable lesson about how fast weather can close in and how stupid it is to “assume” that the weather will clear.
— Miscellaneous —
  • Not knowing if the other aircraft was being provided advisories shouldn’t have been a factor. It’s always, “see and avoid” out there.
  • They say a good approach leads to a good landing. Early recognition of a bad setup will enable a go-around and prevent getting “into the hole” where few options remain.
  • Always have Plan B ready in case something goes wrong—because it will.
  • Line check airmen can make mistakes.
  • Never get distracted from the first priority— fly the airplane!
  • In retrospect, doing a go-around to troubleshoot the problem wasn’t too smart. We had a perfectly good runway right in front of us.
  • I blame the mistake on simple overconfidence. Experience, it seems, is no replacement for doing one’s homework.
  • I learned that if ever there is a doubt, not only as to what ATC said, but also what they meant, I should become absolutely clear about ATC’s instructions, especially before taxiing onto an active runway.
  • It has been my experience that radio transmissions shouldn’t be made to aircraft during the takeoff roll unless absolutely necessary.
  • Looking back on it, I learned two things: 1. Take the time necessary to do the work right even if there is pressure to get the plane out. 2. Always check the part number, no matter who says it’s the right part.
  • The timely and accurate flow of information from the cabin to the cockpit was vital in resolving the situation. Lesson learned: CRM (Crew Resource Management) works!
Once in a while a spelling error, an unusual situation, or a witty comment from a reporter can add a little spice to the thousands of reports screened by ASRS analysts every month. Here are a few examples:
  • I no longer believe my problem was fuel exhaustion, but possibly carb ice. This was the first carbonated airplane I had ever flown.
  • No APU or ground power was available so we did a crossbreed start.
  • Event: Bird strike on Captain’s forward windscreen.
    Cause: Bird was apparently texting.
  • It was very dark in the ramp area and the pilot didn’t have any lights on the airplane. His left wing struck a sign that said, “This is not a taxiway.”
  • Tower said, “[Callsign] turn left and cross Runway 24L and contact ground on the other side.” I informed him that we were unable to comply as we were still on final.
  • The Captain rounded out a bit late, touched down, and skipped back into the air. He was also tired and, not realizing we were airborne again, he pulled the speed brake lever. This time we knew we were on the ground.
ASRS Database Online
The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more.
 Search ASRS Database »
CALLBACK Issue 414
 Download PDF & Print
 View HTML
ASRS Online Resources
 CALLBACK Previous Issues
 Report to ASRS
 View ASRS Report Sets
 ASRS Homepage
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
Contact the Editor
Special Studies
Meteorlogical and Aeronautical Information Services Data Link and Application Study
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
Wake Vortex Encounter Study
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
May 2014
Report Intake:
Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,086
General Aviation Pilots 1,134
Controllers 746
Flight Attendants 493
Mechanics 245
Dispatchers 125
Military/Other 125
TOTAL 7,954
ASRS Alerts Issued:
Subject No. of Alerts
Airport Facility or Procedure 6
ATC Equipment or Procedure 1
TOTAL 7
Subscribe to CALLBACK for FREE!
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NOTE TO READERS:  [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS
A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 414



NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189

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